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Abstract 
This paper presents a model in which legislators use informational advantages to 
engage in rent-seeking activities. Previous work that postulated either informational 
asymmetries or rent-seeking behavior could not explain deviations from the median pref­
erence without reference to "committee power." Integration of these forces demonstrates 
that legislative outcomes need not correspond to the median preference regardless of the 
extent to which "committee power" is present in a legislature. In general, both procedural 
and informational asymmetries can induce deviations in legislative outcomes. 
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1 Introduction 
The expertise of individual legislators played a central role in traditional theories of legislative 
organization. In the United States, committees were formed by the first Congress in order to 
promote the acquisition and revelation of information by legislators [Cooper 1970]. According to 
informational models of legislative organization, legislators use the committee system in order to 
obtain the collective gains associated with information revelation. While the committee system is 
employed to achieve these gains, committees are given minimal procedural advantages in order to 
avoid rent-seeking activities by legislators [Krehbiel 1991:7]. The absence of such "committee 
power" guarantees that legislative outcomes will reflect the median preference of the legislature. 
The enormous growth in the size and scope of government during the twentieth century 
created a renewed interest in the determination and composition of legislative outcomes, and with 
this renewed interest came the most influential attack on the traditional theories of legislative 
01ganization: distributive theory. In distributive models of legislative organization, legislators with 
different policy preferences seek to extract rents from the legislature that are harmful to a legislative 
majority but beneficial to themselves [Weingast and Marshall 1988]. These rents are obtained 
through a collective logroll and safeguarded through procedural advantages at the committee level 
[Shepsle and Weingast 1984]. Thus, "committee power" forms the basis by which legislative 
outcomes diverge from the median preference. 
*1 would like to thank Mike Alvarez, Rod Kiewiet, Morgan Kousser and Tom Palfrey for
helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own. 
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A severe limitation of previous theoretical work is its failure to recognize that deviations 
from the median preference can arise from information differentials as well as committee power. 
When rent-seeking legislators have different levels of expertise, more highly informed legislators 
may be able to move legislative outcomes away from the median preference even if they lack 
"committee power."1 Empirical observers such as Matthews [1959] and Smith and Deering 
[ 1990: 40] have noted the ability of well-informed legislators to affect legislative outcomes, and 
Fenno [1973:96] has written that a legislator who acquires sufficient expertise "may be the most 
influential man in Congress" in his chosen jurisdiction. While such influence would be uninteresting 
if it w ere used to obtain "good public policy" rather than to engage in rent-seeking, it seems unlikely 
that distributive motivations are entirely absent from the utility calculations oflegislators [Krehbiel 
1991: 259-260, Shepsle 1993]. Therefore, legislative outcomes under asymmetric information need 
not reflect the median preference whether or not committee power is present in a legislature. 
In this paper, I integrate informational and distributive aspects of political theory and 
examine the implications for legislative outcomes. The first section of the paper describes the basic 
model and provides a characterization oflegislative preferences. The second section demonstrates 
that, in general, outcomes in a legislature without committees will not correspond to the median 
preference of the legislature. The third section illustrates the effect of information on legislative 
outcomes through a three-person application of the theoretical results. The fourth section 
demonstrates that, when committees with procedural advantages are present in a legislature, 
deviations from the median preference are caused by a combination of committee power and "human 
capital power." The fifth section discusses the predictive power of the legislative equilibrium in 
real-world legislatures. The final section gives concluding thoughts. 
2 The Basic Model 
We suppose a unicameral legislature ofN individuals who differ in two respects: preferences and 
human capital endowments. 2 Each legislator is endowed with levels of human capital over a series 
of mridimensional outcome spaces, which we shall denote asjurisdictional human capital (JHC). 
These human capital levels are constrained to the set of positive real numbers, the unidimensional 
outcome spaces are unbounded, and the structure of the legislature forbids bundling across 
jurisdictions. Consider a given jurisdiction, and represent the human capital endowment of 
legislator i in this jurisdiction by s, . 
2 
Assume that each legislator has an ideal point over each jurisdiction, and let the ideal point 
for legislator i in the jurisdiction of interest be represented by p •1• Suppose that the utility function 
for legislator i is a general Euclidean preference structure of the form 
(1) 
where xis a legislative outcome and K is a positive real number that is greater than one and constant 
across legislators. Under this preference structure, the utility of legislators is monotonically 
decreasing with distance from their ideal points. A further implication is risk-aversion on the part 
oflegislators. 
Although the preference structure of legislators is defined over outcomes, suppose that 
legislators must vote over proposals whose relationship to outcomes is uncertain. Further, suppose 
that jurisdictional human capital reduces the degree of uncertainty associated with an expected 
outcome. Then a proposal from legislator i may be represented as the ordered pair (p,s), where p 
is the expected outcome of the proposal and s is the amount of jurisdictional human capital 
employed in the construction of the proposal. Let a proposal be feasible for legislatorj provided s 
is not greater than sft and suppose that a proposal beats another proposal if it is preferred by a
majority of legislators. Finally, let legislators be ordered by decreasing levels of jurisdictional 
human capital. 
Let fs denote the probability density function around the expected outcome of a proposal 
which embodies s units of human capital. We assume that there is a second-order stochastic 
dominance of J; by fs if and only if s>t. 3 We further assume that t; is symmetric and does not vary 
with expected outcome. Und er these assmnptions, the outcome of a proposal with expected outcome 
p and human capitals may be represented by the equation 
(2) 
where xis the realized outcome of the proposal, p is the expected outcome of the proposal, and w s 
is an error term that incorporates the uncertain relationship between policies and outcomes. 
Under these assumptions, it is possible to characterize legislative preferences (as defined by 
the beat relation) over the proposal space. First, we will examine legislative preferences with 
respect to jurisdictional human capital. Theorem One guarantees that preferences for each 
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legislator over the proposal space are monotonically increasing ins. That is, other things equal, 
legislators will prefer proposals that incorporate greater levels of human capital. 
Theorem One: For any fixed expected outcome p, a proposal (p,s) is unanimously preferred 
to a proposal (p,t) if and only if s>t. 
Proof: Consider the distribution of the error term w. By definition of w, the riskiness of 
a proposal is positively related to the amount of human capital incorporated into the proposal. More 
formally, the distribution of wt is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of ws when s>t.
Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970] demonstrate that, other things equal, risk-averse individuals always 
prefer an original distribution to a mean-preserving spread of that distribution. For this reason, 
every legislator prefers (p,s) to (p,t) when and only when s>t. D 
The following results are implied by Theorem One: 
Result 1.1: Suppose that a proposal (p,s) heats a proposal (p,t) and let r < s. Then (p,s) 
beats (p,r). 
Result 1.2: Suppose that a proposal (p, s) heats a proposal (p, t) and let r > s. Then (p,r) 
beats (p,t). 
Result 1.3: For any given expected outcome p, the proposal (p,s,) heats any other 
feasible proposal (p,s). 
We will now examine legislative preferences with respect to expected outcome. Theorem 
Two guarantees that the beat relationship over the proposal space is monotonic with distance from 
p •. That is, other things equal, the legislature prefers a proposal whose expected outcome is closer 
to the ideal point of the median legislator. 
Theorem Two: For any fixed level of human capitals employed by proposing legislators, 
a proposal (p,s)from legislator i heats a proposal (q,s)from legislator j if and only ifp is closer to
the ideal point of the median legislator than q. 
Proof: The utility derived from a proposal is a function of two parameters: the expected 
outcome of the proposal and the degree of risk associated with the proposal. Since the degree of risk 
associated with the two proposals is identical, (p,s) is preferred to (q,s) by legislator r when 
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Let the ideal point of the median legislator be p •. When both expected outcomes are greater than 
p ·, a majority of legislators has ideal points less than both expected outcomes, and this majority 
prefers the proposal closest top". When both expected outcomes are less than p", a majority of 
legislators has ideal points greater than both expected outcomes, and this majority prefers the 
proposal closest to p •. Finally, when p and q are on opposite sides of p ·, the median legislator and 
every legislator with preferences to one side of p • prefer the proposal whose expected outcome is 
closer top·. Since there are no other possible placements for p and q, the theorem is proven. D 
The following results are implied by Theorem Two: 
Result2.1: Suppose that a proposal (p,s) beats a proposal {q,s) and let 
lr-p • 1 > lq-p • 1 . Then (p,s) beats (r,s). 
Result2.2: Suppose that a proposal (p,s) beats a proposal (q,s) and let 
lr-p • 1 < jp-p • 1 . Then (r,s) beats (q,s). 
Result 2.3: For any given level of jurisdictional human capitals, the proposal (p",s) 
beats any other feasible proposal (p,s). 
We will now examine legislative preferences with respect to both jurisdictional human 
capital and expected outcome. Theorem Three completes the characterization of legislative 
preferences by examining preferences when both human capital and expected outcome differ. It 
illustrates the transitivity of the beat relation. 
Theorem Three: Suppose the legislature must choose between two proposals (p,s) and (q,t) 
using majoritymle. Suppose farther that jp-p • 1 < jq-p •j ands> t. Then it must be the case that 
(p,s) beats (q,t). 
Proof By Theorem One, the following inequalities hold: 
(p,s) beats (p,t) 
(q,s) beats (q,t). 
By Theorem Two, the following inequalities hold: 
(p,s) beats (q,s) 
(p,t) beats ( q,t). 
Therefore, a joint application of Theorems One and Two implies the following chains of 
inequalities: 
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which prove the theorem. D 
(p,s) beats (p,t) beats (q,t) 
(p,s) beats (q,s) beats (q,t), 
3 The Legislative Equilibrium 
The preference results of the previous section pennit a discussion of legislative outcomes. 
Suppose the legislature may engage in pairwise votes between proposals. Let a proposal (p,s) 
from legislator i be a credible threat against a proposal (q,t) from legislator; if and only if 
legislator i prefers (p,s) to (q,t). A proposal (p,s) is a legislative equilibrium if and only if the 
following two conditions hold: 
Acceptability: The proposal (p,s) cannot be beaten by a credible threat from any other 
legislator. 
Proposer Rationality. There is no proposal (q,t) that satisfies theAcceptability condition and 
is preferred to (p,s) by legislator i. 
When a proposal does not satisfy Acceptability, a majority of legislators would prefer a 
different proposal and at least one legislator for whom such a proposal is feasible would be willing 
to offer the new proposal. When a proposal satisfies Acceptability but does not satisfy Proposer 
Rationality, the proposing legislator would prefer to offer a different feasible proposal and a majority 
oflegislators would prefer the new proposal to any credible threat from any other legislator. Both 
conditions, of course, imply rent-seeking on the part oflegislators. 
The following theorem guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the legislative 
equilibrium. 
The Legislative Equilibrium Theorem: Under the assumptions of the human capital 
mode4 there exists a unique stable legislative equilibrium. In this equilibrium, legislator 1 employs 
hisfaO endowment of jurisdictional human capital and chooses the expected outcome closest to his 
ideal point such that Acceptability is satisfied. 
Proof By Result 1.3, a proposal cannot satisfy Acceptability unless it is made by legislator 
1. By Theorem One, a proposal from legislator i cannot satisfy Proposer Rationality unless it
incorporates i's full endowment of human capital, s,. Therefore, no proposal can satisfy the 
conditions for a legislative equilibrium unless it is of the fonn (p,s1).
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Consider the set of proposals (p,s1), and let the interval of expected outcomes which satisfy
Acceptability be [a,b]. Ifp*1 lies within this interval, (p*1,s1) is the unique legislative equilibrium.
Ifp·1 is less than the lower bound of Acceptability, (a,s1) is the unique legislative equilibrium. If p·1
is greater than the upper bound of Acceptability, (b,s1) is the unique legislative equilibrium. Since
there are no other possible placements for p · 1, the theorem is proven. D 
The Legislative Equilibrium Theorem demonstrates that, in a legislature without committees, 
the proposal chosen by the legislature need not conform to the wishes of the median legislator. In 
particular, the most highly informed legislator uses his human capital endowment in order to sway 
the legislative outcome toward his ideal point. Since he does not reveal the contents of his human 
capital stock (and thereby lose his informational advantage) in the construction of a proposal, it is 
inhis interest to employ his full endowment of jurisdictional human capital. When.his preferences 
are extreme and his informational advantage is large, the legislative equilibrium will be relatively 
far from the median preference. When his preferences are moderate and his informational advantage 
is small, the legislative equilibrium will be relatively close to the median preference. 
Under the assumption that legislative outcomes could not depart from the median preference 
without committee power, previous work inferred the degree to which legislatures were 
characterized by committee power from such departures and then judged theoretical perspectives 
from this inference. However, the appropriate empirical test for committee power is the extent to 
which outcomes diverge from the legislative equilibrium. Tests involving the median preference 
demonstrate that some combination of committee power and "human capital power" are present in 
the legislature but cannot differentiate between these forces. Given the extent to which median­
preference comparisons are present in the literature, it is instructive to examine the conditions under 
which the legislative equilibrium is in fact the median preference. Trivially, the correspondence 
holds when the most highly informed legislator is also the median legislator. In general, however, 
the legislative equilibrium differs from the median preference unless the most highly informed 
legislator and his constraining legislator have identical human capital endowments. Thus, under 
almost all distributions of ideal points and human capital endowments, deviations from the median 
preference do not imply the existence of committee power and cannot be used to judge the relative 
importance of informational and distributive forces in a legislature. 
4 A Three-Legislator Example 
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We shall now consider a quantitative illustration of legislative preferences. Suppose that the 
legislature consists of three individuals with ideal points p01. It is useful to begin the legislative 
equilibria calculation with the interval over which a proposal from legislator 1 cannot be beaten. 
The following theorem proves the existence of this interval, which we shall denote as the 
invulnerability interval. 
Theorem Four: For any given human capital level t>s2, there is a unique set of expected 
outcomes 1(9 such that a proposal (q,t) from legislator 1 beats any feasible proposal from any other 
legislator when q E1(9 and is beaten by at least one feasible proposal from another legislator when 
q €£/(t). 
Proof: By Theorem Three, (p0,s2) beats any proposal by any legislator other than J. 
Therefore, the interval in expected outcome space over which (q,t) cannot be beaten is the interval 
over which (p:s2) does not beat (q,t). By transitivity, such an interval must exist. Furthermore, the 
interval is unambiguously larger when the proposal from legislator 1 incorporates higher amounts 
ofhuman capital. Therefore, the interval that is obtained when legislator 1 uses his full endowment 
of human capital, I (s J, is the invulnerability interval. D 
Consider a legislator composed of three individuals with ideal points p •1, and let those 
legislators be ordered by decreasing levels of jurisdictional human capital. In order to simplify the 
mathematical computations without altering any qualitative conclusions, we will make several 
assumptions about preferences and human capital. In particular, let the error term associated with 
a proposal (p,s) be uniformly distributed with mean zero and range [-1/s, lls]. Then the assumption 
of mean-preserving spreads is equivalent to a direct effect of human capital on variance. In this 





It can be shown that the invulnerability interval under the assumptions of this section is given by 
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(6) 
Therefore, a proposal from legislator 1 whose expected outcome lies within this interval cannot be 
beaten if legislator 1 chooses to employ his full endowment of human capital. 
Denote the invulnerability interval by [a,b]. There are four possible cases, shown in Figure 
1 and described below. 
Case One - 1 is the median legislator: Since legislator 1 has the highest endowment of 
jurisdictional human capital, his most preferred feasible proposal is (p01,s1). Therefore, the proposal
(p 01,s 1) is a credible threat by legislator 1 against any other feasible proposal. By Theorem Three,
the proposal (p.1,s1) beats any other feasible proposal from any legislator. Therefore, (p01,s1) is the
legislative equilibrium. 
Case Two - 1 is not the median legislator but his ideal point is within the invulnerability 
interval: Since legislator 1 has the highest endowment of jurisdictional human capital, his most 
preferred feasible proposal is (p01,s1). Therefore, the proposal (p01,s1) is a credible threat by
legislator 1 against any other feasible proposal. Since the expected outcome p 01 lies within the 
invulnerability interval, Theorem Four guarantees that the proposal (p01,s1) beats any feasible
proposal from legislators 2 or 3. Therefore, (p01,s1) is the legislative equilibrium.
Case Three - 2 is the median legislator and J's ideal point is outside the invulnerability 
interval: Suppose without loss of generality that p 01<p •. By definition, no proposal by legislator 1 
whose expected outcome lies within the invulnerability interval can be beaten when 1 employs his 
:fullendowment of jurisdictional human capital. By Theorem Four, the proposal (p0,s2) beats any 
proposal (p,s i) such that p is outside the invulnerability interval; since 2 is the median legislator, the 
proposal (p ·,s2) is a credible threat against any such proposal. Therefore, the set of proposals that 
cannot be beaten by a credible threat is composed of all proposals (p,s1) such that a<p<b. Of these
proposals, legislator 1 prefers (a.si). Therefore, the proposal (a,s,) is the legislative equilibrium. 
Case Four - 3 is the median legislator and J's ideal point is outside the invulnerability 
interval: Suppose without loss of generality that p 01<p •. By definition, no proposal by legislator 1 
whose expected outcome lies within the invulnerability interval can be beaten when 1 employs his 
:full endowment of jurisdictional human capital. By Theorem Four, the proposal (p ·,s2) beats any 
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proposal (p,s 1) such that p is outside the invulnerability interval, and the median legislator prefers
(p�s;J to any proposal (p,s1) such that p<a. Since a majority of legislators share this preference but
legislator 1 does not., it must be the case that legislator 2 also prefers (p ·,s 2). Therefore, the proposal 
(p0,s2) is a credible threat against any proposal (p,s1) such that p<a, and the set of proposals that
carmot be beaten by a credible threat is composed of all proposals (p,s 1) such that a<p<b. Of these
proposals, legislator 1 prefers (a,s1). Therefore, (a,s1) is the legislative equilibrium.
In the three-person legislature, the set of expected outcomes that satisfy Acceptability is 
equivalent to the invulnerability interval because legislator 2 can always present the median 
preference as a credible threat. In general, however, the invulnerability interval forms a subset of 
those expected outcomes that satisfy Acceptability. Intuitively, the invulnerability interval is a 
proper subset when it is possible for both 1 and 2 to gain from rent-seeking on the part of legislator 
1. In particular, when the ideal points of legislators 1and2 are on the same side of p", the set of
proposals from legislator 1 for which (p ·,s 2) is a credible threat does not include a range of points 
beyond the boundary of the invulnerability interval. When this is the case, 2's preferences need not 
define the limits of Acceptability, and if his preferences do define those limits, the interval over 
which a proposal from legislator 1 satisfies Acceptability is unambiguously larger than the 
invulnerability interval. 
5 The Legislative Equilibrium with Committees 
In the United States Congress, legislators are grouped into committees which have substantial 
influence over legislative outcomes. There is a broad consensus among political scientists that 
mechanisms such as gatekeeping authority and the ex post veto provide advantages to congressional 
committee members, and that these advantages bias legislative outcomes toward the preferences of 
committee members [Shepsle and Weingast 1987]. As we have shown, however, deviations from 
the median preference need not imply committee power unless the most informed legislator holds 
the median preference or all legislators have identical endowments of human capital. 
Consider a particular jurisdiction and suppose that a legislative committee is empowered to 
choose the outcome in that jurisdiction. Since the committee is a subset of the legislature, legislative 
equilibria calculated at the committee level need not be equivalent to those calculated for the entire 
legislature. Although it is possible to express the magnitude of these differences in terms of the 
hmnan capital endowments and preference distributions of the committee and the legislature, such 
a characterization would contribute scant empirical or theoretical insight into the effect of human 
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capital on legislative outcomes. However, two assumptions permit a remarkable conclusion about 
the role of human capital in legislatures. First, in accordance with the empirical observation that 
legislators tend to belong to committees in whose jurisdictions they are well-informed, suppose that 
both the most highly informed legislator and the legislator whose preferences define the 
Acceptability constraint belong to the committee in question.· Second, suppose that the median 
preference of the committee is identical to the median preference of the legislature. Under these 
assumptions, the legislative equilibrium produced by the committee is identical to the legislative 
equilibrium without committees regardless of the extent to which nonmembers are procedurally 
disadvantaged. That is, the deviation from the median preference is entirely due to "human capital 
power" rather than committee power. 
The median preference assumption that underlies this conclusion forms a part of the debate 
in political science over the existence of preference outliers on committees. The basic notion of the 
"preference outlier" hypothesis is that committees are in some way unrepresentative of the 
legislature and that this bias causes legislative outcomes to be similarly biased. While distributive 
theorists have assumed the existence of preference outliers, a substantial amount of empirical 
evidence suggests that this assumption does not describe the United States Congress.4 Krehbiel 
[ 1990], for example, identifies three types of preference outliers: committees whose members 
demand uniformly high budgets for their jurisdictions, committees whose members are drawn 
disproportionately from the extremes of the legislature, and committees whose members exhibit 
uniformly high levels of interest in the committee's jurisdiction. Krehbiel tests the "preference 
outlier" hypothesis and finds that neither the high-demand nor the extreme-preference hypotheses 
accurately describe congressional committees. While he does not test for the presence of high­
interest outliers, he notes that such outliers would not by themselves imply a bias in legislative 
outcomes. 
The "preference outlier" controversy is important to the issue of human capital in 
legislatures because it can provide a necessary and sufficient empirical condition for the existence 
of human capital power in legislatures. If the median preference of a committee differs from the 
median preference of the legislature, a deviation from the median preference of the legislature is 
consistent with either human capital power or committee power. u: on the other hand, the median 
preference of a committee is identical to the median preference of the legislature, a deviation from 
the median preference of 1he legislature is consistent with human capital power but inconsistent with 
committee power. Therefore, the absence of "preference outliers" coupled with a deviation from the 
median preference of the legislature is sufficient to prove the existence of human capital power in 
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. legislatures. In fact, deviations by a committee whose distribution of preferences differs from the 
full legislature are sufficient to prove the existence of human capital power provided the median 
preference of the committee is identical to the median preference of the legislature. 
6 A Discussion of the Legislative Equilibrium 
In recent years, political theorists have emphasized the importance of institutional structure on 
voting equilibria. Shepsle [ 1986], for example, details theoretical conditions under which legislative 
institutions can interact with legislator preferences to produce equilibria. Factors such as 
recognition rules for individual legislators and germaneness provisions for legislative proposals 
constrain the set of possible alternatives, and it is possible for these constraints to create or eliminate 
voting equilibria. 
A natural question regarding the legislative equilibria pertains to the assumptions under 
which an institutional structure and proposal mechanism will produce outcomes that correspond to 
the legislative equilibrium. Suppose, in accordance with Baron and Ferejohn [ 1987], that legislators 
are chosen in accordance with an exogenously given recognition rule to submit proposals that then 
face an up-or-down vote by the legislature. Assume further that the legislative session ends when 
a proposal is approved. Under these assumptions, the following conditions are sufficient to 
guarantee the selection of the legislative equilibrium. 
(A) Informational access: The probability of selection for the most highly informed 
legislator approaches unity within a finite number of votes. 
(B) Time-independence: Legislators are neither penalized nor rewarded for the length of 
a legislative session. 
(C) Proposal freedom: Legislators chosen by the recognition rule may propose any 
expected outcome and employ any feasible level of human capital. 
Informational access ensures that the most highly informed legislator is given the opportunity 
to construct a proposal, time-independence ensures that impatience will not induce a legislative 
majority to approve a proposal from a different legislator, and proposal freedom ensures that 
institutional constraints do not prevent the most highly informed legislator from proposing the 
legislative equilibrium. These conditions are highly intuitive aspects of real-world legislatures 
whose primary violations are due to time constraints. Legislators who have expertise in multiple 
jurisdictions might choose to forego a proposal in the jurisdiction of interest, thereby violating 
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informational access. Legislators who face a holiday or an election might approve a proposal that 
the legislative equilibrium could beat, thereby violating time-independence. Finally, institutional 
constraints imposed by the Rules Committee might remove the legislative equilibrium from the set 
of feasible proposals, thereby violating proposal freedom. While these violations can induce a 
legislative outcome other than the legislative equilibrium, they need not do so, and there are a wide 
variety of situations for which the conditions provide a reasonable model of legislative behavior. 
When the conditions hold, the legislative equilibrium provides a prediction about legislative 
outcomes; when the conditions do not hold, the legislative equilibrium provides a benchmark by 
which to judge legislative outcomes. 
7 Conclusion 
Two prominent theories of legislative organization examine legislative outcomes from perspectives 
ot: respectively, informational asymmetry and rent-seeking. In this paper, I have outlined a model 
in which legislators use their expertise to engage in rent-seeking. With this model, I have 
demonstrated that legislative outcomes will not correspond to the median preference unless 
restrictive conditions are satisfied. I characterized the extent to which legislative outcomes will be 
close to (or far from) the median preference of the legislature in the absence of committees. I then 
applied the model to a legislature with committees and showed that previous work has 
systematically overstated the effect of committee power and understated the effect of expertise 
differentials on legislative outcomes. Finally, I have discussed the degree to which the predictions 
of the human capital model are likely to correspond to real-world legislatures. 
The central findings of this paper are relevant to both distributive and informational theories 
of legislative 01ganization. Previous work in both of these areas concluded that legislative outcomes 
would not depart from the median preference unless committee power were present in a legislature 
and then debated the extent to which empirical legislatures were in fact characterized by committee 
power. Since deviations from the median preference need not imply the presence of committee 
power, the link between legislative outcomes and committee power does not hold. Thus, distributive 
theorists can no longer claim that deviations from the median preference imply the existence of 
committee power, and informational theorists can no longer claim that the absence of committee 
power implies median-preference outcomes. 
A significant amount of work remains on the subject of human capital in legislatures. 
Theoretical extensions of the human capital model might examine legislative behavior under 
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additional equilibriwn concepts, introduce time constraints or endogenize hwnan capital investment 
decisions, while empirical extensions of the hwnan capital model might develop measures of 
jurisdictional hwnan capital in order to provide an empirical test of its importance. Despite these 
reservations, the results of this study are unambiguous in their contention that hwnan capital will 
affect legislative outcomes when legislators engage in rent-seeking. Given the empirical importance 
of both informational and distributive forces in legislatures, it is hoped that future work will 
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Endnotes 
I.For a seminal theoretical treatment of legislative decisionmaking under uncertainty, see 
Gilligan and Krehbiel [1989,1990]. 
2.A detailed discussion of human capital is beyond the scope of this paper. A standard reference
is Becker [ 1975]. 
3.Intuitively, the probability density functions around an expected outcomes are tighter when the
proposer employs a relatively large amount of jurisdictional human capital. 
4.This evidence is summarized by Krehbiel [1991: 254-256]. 
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